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In September 2004, the small Caribbean island of
Grenada was severely hit by hurricane Ivan. The
category 3 windstorm, afterwards nicknamed ‘Ivan
the Terrible’, caused an estimated 200 percent of
GDP in damage on the island. The disruptive
impact of the storm caused the local economy to
contract sharply, while at the same time public
spending needs soared. Faced with the overwhelm-
ing costs of the event, soon after the storm, the
Grenadian authorities saw themselves forced to
approach their creditors for a voluntary restructur-
ing of the island’s public debts.
Natural disasters (such as catastrophic hurricanes)
can have far-reaching negative effects on macroeco-
nomic conditions in affected countries, including on
their public finances. And this is especially the case
in developing and smaller countries. Developing
countries are often unable to marshal the substantial
resources needed in the aftermath of a major disas-
ter. Smaller countries (such as the small island states
in the Caribbean and the South Pacific) are typically
unable to achieve the geographic redistribution of
risk available to larger countries,which can subsidize
the costs associated with catastrophic events by
using revenues from unaffected regions. In these
countries, therefore, the large costs associated with
natural disasters can quickly diminish the public sec-
tor’s ability to respond effectively.
Catastrophe insurance markets,however,increasing-
ly offer opportunities for the transfer of such risks.
Thus far, developing countries have only tepidly
begun to tap these opportunities – indeed, only 
3 percent of potential losses in developing countries
are insured compared to 45 percent in advanced
countries – and more frequent and intensive use of
insurance markets may be desirable.This article dis-
cusses available insurance modalities and a few
promising initiatives in developing and emerging
market countries,along with some key challenges for
the insurance community, donors and international
financial institutions.
Preparing for disaster
Although natural disasters have taken their toll
throughout history, there are strong indications that
they have become more frequent and severe in
recent decades and that this upward trend is set to
continue in the period ahead. In part, this trend can
be explained by growing urbanization which has led
to an increasing concentration of population in vul-
nerable areas (see Freeman et al. 2003). For another
part, it reflects changes in weather patterns – possi-
bly associated with the rise in global surface temper-
atures – which appear to have caused an increase in
the frequency and intensity of adverse weather
events such as hurricanes, floods and droughts (see
e.g. Webster  et al. 2005). With more frequent and
intense natural disasters affecting increasingly
densely populated areas, their costs have risen
strongly over time.
Natural disasters can put considerable pressure on
public finances. In the wake of a disaster, govern-
ments typically face a weakened revenue base while
pressures on spending are likely to soar. Such pres-
sures could come from short-term disaster relief
operations,the need to restore key public infrastruc-
ture, or from them provision of financial support to
the private sector (for example, a government will
often be called upon – or even be required by law-to
restore damaged or destroyed housing).
To meet immediate expenditure needs, developing
disaster-prone countries often rely on ex post financ-
ing in the form of grants and loans from external
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donors. Relying on such flows, however, has consid-
erable disadvantages, including because of uncer-
tainty about financing following a disaster. It takes
considerable time before donor resources are com-
mitted and even more time before the funds are
actually made available.And there may be ‘competi-
tion’ for donor resources from other countries with
relief needs at the same time. Indeed, it is often
found that donor contributions following disasters
fall short of actual needs (see e.g.Wong et al. 2009).
Another disadvantage is that to the extent that help
comes in the form of loans, it could add to already
high public debt stocks.
Providing for disasters by means of insurance, in
contrast, secures at least some of the needed
resources in advance.Such insurance is not a remote
theoretical prospect.The experience in high-income
countries, in particular the United States and Japan,
has shown that many natural perils are insurable,
and markets for disaster risk insurance are well
established there.
Given trends in catastrophe insurance pricing and
the available resources in the countries involved,
donor contributions will often be needed, ex ante,t o
contribute to the premia. But such a shift from ex
post to ex ante donor financing still has important
benefits for both parties. From the perspective of the
recipient it introduces an important element of pre-
dictability into post-disaster public finance condi-
tions since the available amount of insurance financ-
ing would be known in advance.From the perspective
of donors it helps smooth cash flow by converting ‘if
and when’ outlays into predictable insurance pre-
mia. It might also give donors greater leverage over
preventive policies (such as building codes). Last,
but not least, it reduces the perverse incentives that
recipient countries face in their dependence on post-
event donor financing. Indeed, vulnerable countries
currently often have little incentive to set aside fiscal
savings or take preventive measures for natural dis-
asters, since this might reduce donor support follow-
ing an adverse event – the so-called Samaritan’s
Dilemma. With predictable insurance payouts, in
contrast, countries retain incentives for fiscal provi-
sioning and preventive structural policies.
Choosing the right insurance
Governments that seek to shield their public finances
from the impact of natural disasters by means of
insurance face a few key choices. A first choice for
governments pertains to who should be the insurance
taker and what should be insured? The inability of the
private sector to cope with the impact of a disaster is
often a key source of budgetary pressures following a
disaster. Therefore, one useful strategy involves pro-
moting, facilitating or subsidizing the purchase of
insurance by private sector parties (for instance,prop-
erty insurance for homeowners or crop insurance for
farmers) in order to limit the government’s contingent
liabilities.Alternatively,or as a complementary strate-
gy,a government can also seek to insure itself directly
against disaster-related outlays, or budgetary pres-
sures more broadly, in a lump-sum manner.
A second key choice for governments regards the
degree to which the risk is transferred and the entity
that ultimately comes to bear the risk. The various
modalities differ crucially in the size of the pool of
risk capital among which the risk is spread.There are
several options:
• Pooling. At one end of the spectrum, countries
can pool their disaster risk with other countries –
thus creating a form of cooperative insurance.
Such a mechanism can be effective when the
number of countries sharing the risk is large
enough, and the correlation of risks between par-
ticipating countries is low.
• Commercial insurance and reinsurance.
Insurance companies, however, may be better
placed to absorb risks because they typically
maintain a well-diversified portfolio of risks.
Further, second tier insurance is available
through reinsurers, who act as the insurance
Table 1 
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companies of the insurers, allowing the latter to
pass on risks that exceed their absorptive capac-
ity. In fact, because of its peculiar loss-distribu-
tion – with low payouts in most years,but sudden
spikes in disaster years – a large portion of cata-
strophic risk ends up with reinsurers. However,
reinsurers, too, have at times had difficulty cop-
ing with peaks in insurance claims, which is
reflected in a high volatility of reinsurance pre-
mia (for instance, insurance premiums, as mea-
sured by the ‘rate-on-line’, rose sharply follow-
ing costly disasters such as hurricane Andrew in
1992 and hurricane Katrina in 2005).
• Capital markets. There where risks are testing rein-
surers’ capacity, capital markets are progressively
providing risk capital that can be tapped by both
reinsurers and countries themselves through the
use of insurance-linked securities.This is an encour-
aging development because by allocating risks –
and potential losses – efficiently over a large pool of
investors, insurance through capital markets offers
promising prospects of reducing the premium
volatility associated with traditional reinsurance.
Advances in catastrophe insurance
The possibilities for passing risk to capital markets
have been greatly enhanced by two related innova-
tions: the use of parametric insurance triggers and
the growth of the ‘cat bond’ market.
Parametric insurance – keeping it simple
Traditionally, insurance has relied on indemnity-
based triggers where insurance payouts are calibrat-
ed on the basis of actual and verified losses.The key
advantage of this type of trigger is that the insurance
payout is typically close to the actual loss incurred.
There are, however, also important disadvantages,
such as time-consuming claims settlement and moral
hazard issues. The use of alternative parametric
insurance triggers can alleviate some of these disad-
vantages, while also offering greater scope for the
standardization of contracts and thereby facilitating
the transfer of risks to capital markets.
Parametric insurance uses objective variables that
are exogenous to the policy holder but have a strong
correlation with losses against which insurance is
desired. The payout is determined upfront and is
conditional on the chosen exogenous variable reach-
ing a preset threshold within a certain time period.
An example of parametric insurance are so-called
weather derivatives,which link payouts to the occur-
rence of a certain weather event (such as wind
speeds exceeding, or precipitation falling short of,
certain pre-agreed thresholds).Parametric insurance
could be seen as essentially an informed bet against
the elements. As such, parametric insurance con-
tracts are kindred to the options and futures con-
tracts traded on financial markets and distinct from
traditional indemnity-based insurance.
In contrast to indemnity-based insurance, parametric
insurance tends to have a benign incentives structure.
Since payout and actual damage are not directly linked,
moral hazard is limited and the insured party retains
incentives for prevention and mitigation of risks.
Another key advantage of parametric insurance con-
tracts is their relative simplicity and transparency.The
use of an exogenous variable
greatly reduces the information
asymmetries associated with tra-
ditional insurance and eliminates
the need for an assessment or
verification of actual damage.
Consequently, transaction costs
are relatively low. A related ad-
vantage is the potential speed of
payout, which, in contrast to
indemnity-based insurance, can
be a matter of weeks or even days
after the contract is triggered.
Since parametric insurance uses
objective and often publicly a-
vailable information, it also al-
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thereby facilitating risk transfer
to international capital markets.
Indeed, as more sophisticated
systems (including satellite
imagery) become available to
monitor and measure natural
events,parametric insurance con-
tracts have the potential to be-
come increasingly palatable to
international capital markets.
Moreover,such technological ad-
vances also increasingly facilitate
the reliable monitoring of events
in developing countries, thereby
expanding their possibilities to
successfully tap international
insurance and capital markets.
The main inherent disadvantage of parametric insur-
ance triggers is the so-called basis risk: since there is
no relation (at least ex post) between the predeter-
mined payout and actual damage, the insurance
claim may either exceed or undershoot the actual
loss. Refinements in loss modeling, however, can
potentially reduce basis risk.
Cat bonds – tapping a wider market
A key example of an innovative instrument which
emergence was facilitated by the use of parametric
insurance triggers is the catastrophe (or ‘cat’) bond.
Cat bonds have been an important vehicle for the
transfer of catastrophe risks to capital markets.
Indeed, the market for cat bonds has grown rapidly
since its inception in the second half of 1990s, and
while – like many other financial instruments –
issuance has suffered from the global financial cri-
sis, the market has been recovering swiftly over the
past year.
The typical cat bond issue involves the establishment,
by the ‘sponsor’ (usually a reinsurance company but
conceivably another entity), of a Special Purpose
Vehicle (SPV). The task of this SPV is to issue the
bond and to invest the capital in low-risk securities
(such as treasuries).The returns on these investments
are paid to the holders of the bonds, together with a
premium that is paid by the sponsor (see Figure 3,
panel A). If the bonds mature without a prespecified
event (i.e. a narrowly defined type of catastrophe)
having taken place, the principal is repaid to the
investors, similar to regular bonds (panel B).
However, in the event that the prespecified catastro-
phe does occur within the life time of the bond,
investors agree to forfeit part or
all of their claims, and the SPV
will pay out to the sponsor
instead. The catastrophe risk is
thus transferred to the investors.
Because assets and liabilities
related to the bond issue are
allocated with the SPV, cat
bonds function as a pure insur-
ance arrangement for the spon-
sor, and are not debt creating.
The key advantage of cat bonds
is that it allows for the break up
and transfer of risks to a large
group of investors in cases
where insurance with a single
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available or be more expensive. From the perspec-
tive of the investor, cat bonds yield above-market
rates (since a premium is paid on top of the low-
risk/risk-free return), while offering a unique
opportunity for portfolio diversification as a cata-
strophe risks tend to be uncorrelated with trends in
stock or bond markets.
Key initiatives in low and middle-income countries
In recent years, there have been several promising
initiatives in low- and middle-income countries,
some of which have benefitted from the recent inno-
vations in insurance. The initiatives can be divided
into three broad categories:
• Schemes aimed at limiting government contingent
liabilities. These schemes target the private sector
so as to reduce the need for government support
following disasters.A good example is the Turkish
Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP),which is sup-
ported by the World Bank and pools and rein-
sures risks from a compulsory earthquake insur-
ance scheme for private home-owners. Similarly,
there have been World Bank and International
Finance Corporation (IFC) supported projects
that helped offer drought insurance to individual
farmers in several low-income countries, includ-
ing India and Malawi.
• Schemes to provide resources for disaster relief
and reconstruction. With these schemes, the gov-
ernment seeks to secure resources to cover relief
operations in the event of a catastrophe. An
example is the 2006 World Food Program (WFP)
project in Ethiopia that used a weather deriva-
tive to ensure resources in the case of a cata-
strophic drought. In this case, the insurance
money was designed to be spent by the govern-
ment and the WFP was responsible to relieve the
plight of affected farmers, while donors con-
tribute to the premia. Another example is
FONDEN in Mexico. This fund started as a
means of earmarking resources for future disas-
ter relief,to be spent by local governments on an
as-needed basis. In May 2006, the fund got on
more secure financial footing when Mexico
became the first middle-income country to issue
a cat bond to secure sufficient funds in the event
of a major earthquake, with a verifiable para-
metric trigger.
• Schemes to provide lump sum support to the gov-
ernment budget. Instead of purchasing insurance
against specific outlays, governments can seek
general, lump-sum support that is conditional on
a certain disaster taking place. Such funds could
then be spent at the government’s discretion.
Schemes of this type have been gaining some
popularity in recent years. For instance, the
World Bank has implemented a scheme along
these lines in the Caribbean from May 2007.This
‘Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility
(CCRIF)’, is the first multi-country risk pool in
the world and helps insure 16 islands in the
region – including Grenada, which was men-
tioned above – to insure against the risk of earth-
quakes and hurricanes, using parametric insur-
ance triggers. The pool is funded by resources
from participating governments and contribu-
tions from donors, while risks that exceed the
capacity of the pool are being transferred to
reinsurance markets. This two-tier structure
allows the facility to cope with large losses and
also provides participating governments with
insurance coverage at about half the price they
would have paid if they had purchased insurance
individually (Wong et al. 2009). The Caribbean
facility has so far proven successful and it has
made several payouts over the past 3 years.Most
recently, a payout was made to Haiti, which
received 8 million US dollars from the fund
within two weeks after a devastating earthquake
hit the island in early 2010.Based on the positive
experiences, the CCRIF is currently considering
the possibility of insuring more frequent events
and widening its coverage to include flood cov-
erage and agricultural damage, while the World
Bank is preparing a similar initiative for Pacific
island countries.
Amid these encouraging initiatives, the key area
where exploring is still in its early stages, is the
transfer of risk to capital markets. Thus far, only
Mexico has significant experience with tapping the
international capital market by means of cat
bonds. Two promising new World Bank projects,
however, are likely to enable a broader range of
low and middle income countries to tap a range 
of financial market counterparties and capital
markets.
• Catastrophe bond issuance platform. Building on
Mexico’s experience, in October 2009, the World
Bank launched the ‘MultiCat program’, a cata-
strophe bond issuance platform that will make it
easier for governments and public entities in lowCESifo Forum 2/2010 41
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income countries to access the cat bond market.
Under the platform, the World Bank will act as
arranger for the transactions and all bonds
issued will carry the common MultiCat brand
name and benefit from a common legal structure
and documentation. This standardization re-
duces the set up costs to the issuing countries,
and also makes the bonds more palatable to
investors.
• Weather derivative intermediation. In 2008, the
World Bank has also begun to offer intermedia-
tion services to low-income countries that want
to use weather derivatives. Here, the World
Bank intermediates the risk of weather-based
catastrophes by entering into mirroring transac-
tions with the client country and a financial
market counterpart. In the event of a severe
weather event, the country would receive a pay-
out from the World Bank, the total value of
which would be based on a parametric index
used as an estimate of the financial impact.The
payout would be funded with the payout that
the World Bank would receive from the finan-
cial market counterpart in the mirroring trans-
action. Malawi has been the first country to 
use this new facility, purchasing insurance cover
against a drought-related shortfall in maize 
production, with Swiss Re as the insurance
provider. Malawi was sponsored by Britain
(DFID) to cover the costs of the insurance pre-
mium.
Weathering storms on the horizon
Transferring risks to international capital markets
has substantial benefits because it greatly expands
the pool of insurance capital available to developing
countries, and significant progress has been made in
recent years.Nonetheless,there remain a number of
uncertainties associated with the insurance of natur-
al disaster risk. Importantly, even though there are
well-established markets for insuring certain cata-
strophe risks, it cannot be taken for granted that all
natural disaster risks can be insured in the market at
an affordable cost. Specifically, the catastrophe
insurance market faces two sources of uncertainty:
the first is climate change and its possible effect on
the frequency and intensity of natural disasters.
While the insurance industry has coped so far, the
record insurance losses in recent years – including
high losses from a multitude of events in 2008 and
the record-breaking USD 45 billion losses from hur-
ricane Katrina in 2005 – have been raising doubts
about the way forward.Indeed,the insurance indus-
try has been paying increasing attention to climate
change and its implications for their risk modeling
and risk management.The increasing risk of natural
disasters, or persistent uncertainty with respect to
the effects of climate change, may have an adverse
effect on catastrophe insurance availability and pre-
mia going forward.
A second source of uncertainty lies with the appetite
for catastrophe risk in international capital markets.
Up to the global financial crisis that broke in the fall
of 2008, issuers have had relatively few problems in
selling the innovative and relatively risky cat bonds
to international investors seeking risk diversifica-
tion.But the success of these new (and relatively low
volume) instruments was spurred by favorable glob-
al liquidity conditions and a quest for yield on the
part of investors, which led to a gradual decline in
risk premia. Although early indications of recovery
in the cat bond market are encouraging,it remains to
be seen whether a similar favorable environment
will prevail in the years ahead.
These issues aside, affordability of catastrophe insur-
ance for developing countries will remain an issue
even under more favorable scenarios. Indeed, in light
of the frequent high cost and volatility in insurance
premia, the viability of catastrophe insurance mecha-
nisms for developing countries may crucially depend
on the contribution of donors, particularly in the low-
income context. Mobilizing further, and continued,
donor support for disaster insurance schemes is there-
fore another challenge. While donor involvement so
far is encouraging, it is uncertain whether there is a
willingness to increasingly engage in structural sup-
port arrangements at the expense of post-disaster
relief. The latter remains the norm and may offer
greater benefits in terms of public recognition and in
satisfying the urge to show support after a catastrophe
has taken place. Thus, further developing sustainable
models for collaboration among donors and recipi-
ents in disaster insurance schemes remains key.
The potential benefits of a change from ex post to ex
ante insurance financing are considerable.While nat-
ural disasters are likely to remain a painful fact of
life, such a shift would at least help reduce the sec-
ond round fiscal effects, thereby limiting economic
disruption and facilitating faster recovery, while also
providing better incentives for the adoption of pre-
ventive policies.CESifo Forum 2/2010 42
Focus
References
Freeman, P., M. Keen and M. Mani (2003), Dealing with Increased
Risk of Disasters: Challenges and Options, IMF Working Paper
WP/03/197.
Heller, P. and M. Mani (2002), “Adapting to Climate Change”,
Finance and Development 39, 29–31.
Rasmussen,T.(2006),“Natural Disasters and Their Macroeconomic
Implications”, in: Ratna Sahay et al. (eds.), The Caribbean – From
Vulnerability to Sustained Growth,Washington DC: IMF, 181–203.
Webster, P. J., G. J. Holland, J. A. Curry and H. R. Chang (2005),
“Changes in Tropical Cyclone Number,Duration,and Intensity in a
Warming Environment”, Science 309, 1844–1846.
Wong, Y. C., A. Lemus and N. Wagner (2009), Insuring Against
Natural Disasters in the Caribbean, IMF Country Report 09/176,
Washington DC: IMF.